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The extant literature has established that the occurrence of major terrorist events leads to 
negative abnormal returns not only to the location of the event, but also to third countries. 
However, the literature has neither investigated which are the diffusion mechanisms of 
terrorist shocks, nor whether the diffusion pattern is uniform. Given terrorism’s 
idiosyncrasies and motivated by memory-based utility and the Availability heuristic, we 
conjecture that the stock market reaction depends on the country’s perceived terrorism 
risk. We document that terrorism risk perception is able to explain a statistically 
significant portion of cross-country abnormal returns’ variation. Moreover, risk 
perception’s predictive power over abnormal returns is robust, even when we take into 
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1. Introduction 
The empirical literature has econometrically established the significant - and 
immediate - stock market reaction, to major terrorist attacks, not only in the location of 
attack, but also in third countries’ capital markets (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Carter 
and Simkins 2004; Chen and Siems 2004; Drakos 2004; Eldor and Melnick 2004; Maillet 
and Michel 2005; Gulley and Sultan 2006; Amélie and Darné 2006; Nikkinen et al., 
2008). However, no study thus far, has investigated any aspect of the underlying 
diffusion mechanism, or in other words which are the determinants of cross-country 
reactions. This is exactly the gap the present study aspires to fill.  
The cross-country reaction to the news of a major terrorist event occurrence is 
broadly compatible with the predictions of economic theory, which suggest that major 
shocks, especially of an adverse nature, typically produce effects transcending their 
country of origin or occurrence. In particular, economic linkages can provide a channel 
via which shocks are transmitted, either due to a spillover effect or due to contagion 
(Calvo and Reinhart 1996; Masson 1998; Wolf 1999; Dornbusch et al., 2000; Forbes and 
Rigobon 2002).  
However, the present paper proposes a behavioral-based, and more importantly 
independent of linkages, potential driver of stock market reactions. The point of departure 
is that major terrorist incidents, although definitely fitting the description of adverse 
shocks affecting capital markets, they possess certain idiosyncrasies, such as high stakes, 
intense public discussion, immediate and extensive media coverage, and complex 
emotional content (Fischhoff et al., 2005), what Slovic (2002) concisely articulated as “a 
new species of trouble”. These idiosyncrasies are well capable of triggering reactions,   3
over and beyond those elicited by economic fundamentals, which are essentially driven 
by, or related to, behavioral factors. In particular, major terrorist attacks are usually 
catastrophic in nature, causing many fatal casualties and / or extensive property damages. 
Hence, their occurrence has immediate, direct and pervasive psychosocial consequences 
that cannot be matched by other adverse economic shocks hitting capital markets. Of 
critical importance is the potential major terrorist incidents have to adversely affect social 
mood, and accordingly to deteriorate investor sentiment, where the latter can exercise 
downward pressure on stock prices (Hirshleifer 2001; Shiller 2003). We further 
conjecture that the degree of sentiment deterioration, and thus the size of stock market 
reaction, crucially depends on each country’s perceived terrorism risk. This mechanism 
can generate diverse (stock market) reactions across different receptors (countries), 
facing an identical stimulus (the realization of a major terrorist attack) and is compatible 
with the so-called memory-based utility (Elster and Loewenstein 1992, Kahneman et al., 
1997) and one of the behavioral heuristics known as Availability (Tversky and Kahneman 
1973, 1974; Carroll 1978).  
The present study makes a twofold contribution to the literature. Firstly, it 
explicitly investigates for the first time the cross-country variation in stock market 
reaction to major terrorist events. Thus, it extends the literature which has so far 
exclusively focused on whether such events do affect capital markets. Secondly, it 
provides a behavioral-based explanation for the diffusion of terrorist events’ shocks. In 
doing so we show another, previously ignored, dimension of the manner in which 
terrorism might affect capital markets. Shedding light on this issue, apart from its pure 
academic importance, it also has important implications for portfolio management. In   4
particular, by pinning down the determinants of market reactions’ to terrorist events, one 
could exploit this information for diversification purposes.   
In the subsequent empirical analysis, we focus on abnormal returns generated 
from a three-factor world model for daily returns across 29 European countries over the 
period 2002-2005. Then we investigate whether the cross-country variation of abnormal 
returns on the days of major terrorist attacks is related to the cross-country variation in 
terrorism risk perception. We document that terrorism risk perception is able to explain a 
statistically significant portion of cross-country abnormal returns. Moreover, risk 
perception retains its predictive power over abnormal returns, even when we take into 
account countries’ terrorism record or when we control for economic linkages.  
The remainder of the paper is constructed as follows: Section 2 provides the 
motivation for the conducted analysis. Section 3 presents the data used. Section 4 
describes the econometric methodology employed. Section 5 presents and discusses the 
empirical results, as well as, conducts sensitivity analysis. Finally, section 6 concludes.                                  
2. Motivation 
2.1  The baseline pricing framework  
Our departure point is the asset pricing framework driving international stock 
market returns. The first building block is the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965), where in an international context the global value-weighted 
market portfolio is the relevant risk factor (Grauer et al. 1976; Adler and Dumas 1983). 
Then we consider an international version of the three-factor model (Fama and French 
1993, 1996) as follows:  
() ,, ,, i t wmp i wmp hml i hml smb i smb Er λβ λ β λβ =+ +                       (1)   5
Where  () , it E r  is the expected return on stock index ( ) i  at time () t  in excess of a 
risk-free rate,  () , wmp wmp t Er λ = ,  ( ) , hml hml t Er λ = , and  ( ) , smb smb t Er λ =  are the risk premia of 
the World Market Portfolio, the High-minus-Low earnings-price ratio portfolio, and the 
Small-minus-Big market value portfolio respectively. Similarly,  , iw m p β ,  , ih m l β , and  , is m b β  
are the betas of stock index () i , measuring its sensitivity to each of the risk factors.  
This relationship becomes estimable when we allow for a stochastic shock that 
generates possibly non-spherical deviations from the long-run as follows: 
() ,, , , ,, , , it w m pt iw m p h m lt ih m l s m bt is m b it rr r r u βββ =+ + +                     (2)   
2.2  Introducing the terrorism shock    
We define ( ) , ct mgt  as an indicator variable which when attains the value of unity 
denotes the occurrence of a mega terrorist incident on day ( ) t  and country () c . In 
contrast, when () , ct mgt  attains the value of zero there is no major terrorist event. Thus, in 
order to investigate whether third countries’ markets react to the news of major terrorist 
attacks in another country, we allow the return generation process to differ between 
‘normal’ periods (i.e in the absence of major terrorist events) and periods where such 
events occur. So returns are determined as follows:         
( ) ,, , , , , , , , ,      it w m pt iw m p h m lt ih m l s m bt is m b i ct it rr r r m gtui c βββ γ =+ + ++ ≠                 (3) 
The parameter () i γ  captures the sensitivity of third countries’ returns to the news 
of terrorist attack occurrence in another country and our prior is that it will carry a 
negative sign. Thus, provided that ( ) 0 i γ < , the realization of a terrorist shock will be 
diffused to third countries. Moreover, the returns in ‘normal’ periods (i.e in the absence   6
of major terrorist events) are driven by fundamentals as described by a standard asset 
pricing equilibrium model. In contrast during non-normal periods, although fundamentals 
continue to play a role, returns exhibit a transitory deviation from equilibrium. Hence, the 
following holds:        
() () ,, ,, | 1 | 0 0,         it ct it ct i E rm g t E rm g t ic γ = − ==< ≠                   (4) 
                  
This expression suggests that third countries’ abnormal returns on days that major 
terrorist events occur are, on average, lower than returns on normal periods. This is a 
testable implication that we will explore later on.  
2.3  Risk perception as a potential diffusion mechanism 
Recall that our main purpose is to investigate if the proposed behavioral-related 
mechanism could be responsible for determining the extent of a given country’s stock 
market reaction. A distinctive feature of major terrorist events is that, although they 
certainly fit the general description of an adverse shock, they possess properties that are 
markedly different from those of other shocks that usually hit financial markets. In 
particular, major terrorist events are typically catastrophic in nature, causing many fatal 
casualties and / or substantial property damages. Hence, their occurrence has immediate 
and direct psychosocial consequences that cannot be matched by other ‘standard’ adverse 
shocks hitting capital markets. Moreover, even when compared with other hazards, the 
perceived severity of mega-terrorist events is so acute that places them in the extreme 
upper-right quadrant of Slovic’s well known two-factor space (Slovic 1987). Factor-1, 
known as ‘dread risk’, measures the hazard’s perceived lack of control, dread, 
catastrophic potential, and fatal consequences. Factor-2, known as ‘unknown risk’,   7
measures the extent to which a hazard is perceived as unobservable, unknown, new and 
delayed in its manifestation of harm.  
Essentially, major terrorist incidents have the potential to adversely affect social 
mood and consequently deteriorate investor sentiment that can exercise downward 
pressure on stock prices (Hirshleifer 2001; Shiller 2003; Stracca 2004). Significant 
terrorist events can serve as mood indicators since they easily satisfy the three main 
criteria proposed by Edmans et al. (2007), i.e. (i) that they should drive mood in a ample 
and unambiguous manner, increasing the likelihood that their effect is vigorous enough to 
be reflected on asset prices, (ii) that they should affect the mood of a large part of the 
population and therefore it is likely to influence a particular subset of it, i.e the stock 
market participants, and (iii) that their impact should be correlated across agents within a 
country.       
Behavioral economics may also assist us in explaining both why third countries 
react and also what accounts for the cross-sectional variation of reactions. The observed 
spillover of shocks is consistent with the phenomenon of social amplification of risk 
(Slovic 1987; Kasperson et al,, 1988; Burns et al. 1990), but taking place on an 
international level. Social amplification is triggered by the occurrence of an adverse event 
that falls into the high-ends of ‘dread risk’ and/or ‘unknown risk’ and has consequences 
that spread outwards, affecting first the immediate victims and then sequentially other 
agents. It has many times been compared to the dropping of a stone in a pond whose 
ripples spread ever outward. The variation in magnitude of third countries’ market 
reactions cannot however be explained by the social amplification of risk. Essentially we 
need a mechanism that has the potential to generate diverse (stock market) reactions   8
among different receptors (countries) facing an identical stimulus (the realization of a 
given major terrorist attack). We argue that the degree of reaction depends on the 
receptor’s prior perception regarding the level of terrorism risk she faces. Clearly, as we 
will demonstrate later, neither all countries have identical records of terrorist activity, nor 
have identical levels of perceived terrorism risk. As it turns out, and in line with one’s 
intuition, the stated terrorism risk perception is highly correlated with a country’s past 
record of terrorism activity. This heterogeneity is rather crucial for the problem at hand, 
for it has the potential to generate markedly diverse responses to a given mega-terrorist 
event.  
Behavioral economics has shown that current actions, and in particular reactions 
to a stimulus, may be profoundly affected by the so-called memory-based utility (Elster 
and Loewenstein 1992, Kahneman et al., 1997). Memory-based utility qualifies the 
subject’s retrospective evaluation of past episodes and situations as valid data. Thus, we 
conjecture that agents (investors) in countries with different terrorism risk perceptions 
due to their dissimilar histories, will also have different memory-based utilities. In other 
words, the memory-based utility’s negative emotions will be stronger and therefore 
trigger a stronger stock market reaction, in countries with higher terrorism risk 
perception. Another plausible mechanism, and similar in spirit, might be one of the 
behavioral heuristics known as Availability, according to which one judges the 
probability of an event by the ease to imagine relevant instances, or by the number of 
such instances that are readily retrieved from memory (Tversky and Kahneman 1973, 
1974; Carroll 1978). From the above discussion emerges the clear-cut testable 
implication that in the occurrence of a major terrorist event, the cross-country variation of   9
stock market responses will be significantly explained by the cross-country variation in 
terrorism risk perception.  
Going back to the return generation process, we investigate whether third 
countries’ sensitivity to major terrorist events depends on the level of terrorism risk 
perception. Let () , it z  denote a country’s terrorism risk perception level. Then in the spirit 
of Bekaert and Harvey (1995, 1997), Ng (2000), Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Bekaert 
et al. (2005), we allow third countries’ sensitivity to be cross-sectionally varying as 
follows:  
() 0, 1 , ii i t z γδδ =+                                                      (5) 
Then expression (3) becomes:  
( ) ( )
() ( ) ()
,, , , , , , 0 , 1 , , ,
,, ,, ,, 0 , , 1 , , ,
*
     *
it w m pt iw m p h m lt ih m l s m bt is m b i it ct it
w m pt iw m p h m lt ih m l s m bt is m b ct i it ct it
rr r r z m g t u
rr r m g t z m g t u
βββ δ δ
βββ δ δ
 =+ + + + + = 
=+ + ++ +
  
         (6) 
This expression nests various alternative configurations regarding the diffusion of 
terrorist shocks. For instance, if terrorism had only local effects, i.e. affecting only the 
country that experiences the terrorist event, and therefore third countries did not react, the 
following would hold:   
0, 1 0 i δ δ ==                                            (7) 
 
Another possibility is that third countries react but in a uniform manner, i.e. terrorism risk 
perception plays no role in the diffusion of terrorist shocks:  
0, 1 00 i δ δ <∧ =                                         (8) 
   10
Finally, the situation where third countries do react but the diffusion of shocks is non-
uniform would imply that:  
0, 1 0, 0  i δ δ <<                                                                  (9) 
Suppose for the time being that the sign configuration shown in (9) is valid, then it would 
imply that:  
() () ( ) ,, ,, 0 , 1 , | 1 | 0 0,         it ct it ct i it E rm g t E rm g t E z ic δδ = − ==+ < ≠                                        (10) 
This expression has two testable implications: (i) third countries’ abnormal returns (stock 
market reactions) are significantly lower on days of major terrorist events’ occurrence, i.e 
terrorist shocks are diffused cross-nationally, and (ii) the size of reaction (absolute 
magnitude of abnormal returns) increases with the level of terrorism risk perception.  
     
3. Data  issues 
3.1  Returns and systematic risk factors   
Daily closing prices from 1/1/2002 to 30/12/2005 in local currencies for broad 
stock market indices where obtained from Datastream as follows: ATX (Austria), BEL 
20 Price (Belgium), BSE SOFIX (Bulgaria), CROBEX (Croatia), Cyprus General 
(Cyprus), PRAGUE SE PX (Czech Republic), OMX 20 COPENHAGEN (Denmark), 
OMX TALLINN (Estonia), OMX HELSINKI (Finland), CAC 40 (France), DAX 30 
(Germany), ATHEX Composite (Greece), Budapest BUX Price Index (Hungary), 
IRELAND SE OVERALL ISEQ (Ireland), MILAN MIDEX (Italy), OMX RIGA 
(Latvia), OMX VILNIUS (Lithuania), Luxemburg SE General (Luxemburg), MSE 
(Malta), AMSTERDAM SE ALL SHARE PRICE INDEX (Netherlands), WARSAW 
GENERAL INDEX (Poland), PSI GENERAL (Portugal), BET COMPOSITE INDEX   11
(Romania), SAX INDEX (Slovakia), SB 120 (Slovenia), Madrid SE General (Spain), 
OMX STOCKHOLM (Sweden), ISE NATIONAL 100 (Turkey), FTSE All Share (UK).  
The three benchmark portfolios denoting the risk factors are proxied by the global 
equity market portfolios maintained by World Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI World) indices as follows: ( ) , wmp t r  defined as the return on the world market 
portfolio,  () , smb t r  defined as the difference between the return on a world portfolio of 
small capitalization stocks and the return on a portfolio of large capitalization stocks 
(smb, small minus big), () , hml t r  defined as the difference between the return on a world 
portfolio of high book-to-market stocks (value) and the return on low book-to-market 
(growth) stocks (hml, high minus low), which proxies the value of distress premium.  
Table 1 provides the main descriptive statistics for countries’ daily returns as well 
as for the benchmark portfolios (risk factors).   
----------Table 1---------- 
3.2  Measuring terrorism risk perception  
In order to proxy terrorism risk perception we resort to the Eurobarometer which 
is a harmonized micro survey of representative samples for each EU member state 
(including the Candidate countries). Certain Eurobarometer surveys include a question 
that asks respondents to state which are the two most important issues their country faces. 
The exact phrasing of the question is:  
“What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the 
moment?” 
Respondents are shown a card listing the following: crime, public transport, 
economic situation, rising prices / inflation, taxation, unemployment, terrorism, defence   12
/ foreign affairs, housing, immigration, health care system, educational system, pensions, 
protecting the environment, others (spontaneous), DK.  In particular, we use the 
following Eurobarometer issues for EB 57.2 (2002), EB 60.1 (2003), EB 62 (2004), EB 
64.2 (2005) and CCEB 2003.2 for candidate countries. Based on the micro data we 
calculate the percentage of respondents by country and year that mentioned terrorism as 















                        (11) 
Where  () i  denotes country, ( ) y  year, n the number of respondents mentioning 
terrorism as one of the two most important issues, and N  stands for the total number of 
respondents participating in the survey. This metric is employed as a proxy for the 
country’s level of terrorism risk perception in the given year. As the metric increases we 
interpret it as denoting higher perceived terrorism risk. Table 2 shows the basic 
descriptive statistics of terrorism risk perception by country. The highest risk perception 
is found in Spain, followed by the UK, Turkey and Denmark with 53.92 %, 23.94 %, 
21.56 % and 16.58 % respectively.    
----------Table 2---------- 
3.3 Identifying  major  terrorist  attacks: the stimulus    
Apparently there is no hard definition of what constitutes a major-terrorist incident and 
consequently some arbitrariness in the choice of events is in order. In any case, the choice 
of incidents for our analysis was based on three criteria: (i) it had to be in the post 2002 
period for which data on terrorism risk perception is available, (ii) it had to have take 
place in Europe and (iii) it had to have take place on a trading day (i.e stock markets   13
should have been in operation, restriction that excludes events that occurred in weekends 
and national holidays. In addition, events that occurred after 18:00 GMT were also 
disregarded. There are four terrorist incidents that satisfied these criteria: the Moscow 
attack on October 23
rd 2002, the Istanbul attack on November 20
th 2003, the Madrid 
attack on March 11
th 2004 and the London attack on July 7
th 2005. Table 3 provides some 
important background information related to these attacks.    
----------Table 3---------- 
4. Econometric  methodology 
We use a flexible empirical specification whose core is a three-factor world model where, 
apart from the current values of the risk factors, we also include up to five lags to capture 
any non-synchronization in trading. In addition, we allow for a similar autoregressive 
structure for country returns. In order to capture any calendar anomalies we use fixed 
month and day effects, over and above year effects (Gibbons and Hess 1981; Jaffe and 
Westerfield 1985; Kato and Shallheim 1985; Board and Sutcliffe 1988; Choudhry 2001). 
The employed baseline empirical model is of the following form: 
()
() ( ) ( )
55 5 5
,0 , , , , , , ,
00 0 1
,         + year effects month effects day effects
i t wmp j wmp t j smb j smb t j hml j hml t j j i t j
jj j j
ii t




      
=+ + + +       
      
++ + +
∑∑ ∑ ∑
            
       (12)  
Given the panel dimension we condition on country heterogeneity allowing for an 
unobserved effect  i µ  treated as random, assuming that  ( ) , 0      , , it j i E ri j t µ − =∀ . 
A well established empirical regularity is the volatility clustering exhibited by 
daily returns (Engle 1982; Bollerslev 1986). Thus, in order to control for this we employ   14
a Pooled Panel GARCH (PP-GARCH hereafter) model for the conditional volatility of 
stock returns (Cermeno and Grier 2006). Although multivariate GARCH models are also 
available, they are not practical for most panel applications because they require the 
estimation of a large number of parameters which consumes degrees of freedom rapidly. 
In contrast, PP-GARCH estimation by imposing common dynamics on the variance-
covariance process across cross-sectional units reduces the number of parameters 
dramatically ensuring parsimony. So the properties of the error term are as follows:  
() , 0 it E ε =  and  ()
22
,, it it E ε σ =  
In particular, assuming that  ,, ~0 , it it N ε   Ω  , i.e. are multivariate normal error 
terms with a time-varying conditional variance-covariance matrix produces a PP-
GARCH model (Cermeno and Grier 2006). The variance-covariance matrix  , it Ω  is time-
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where the 
* θ ’s, ψ ’s, η ’s and ρ ’s denote unknown constant parameters to be estimated.   
4.1 Do  mega-terrorist  events affect returns?   
The first step in our econometric investigation is to test whether returns are indeed 
affected, and in the predicted direction, by the occurrence of mega-terrorism events. Thus 
we augment the baseline model (equation 12) with the dummy that identifies the four 
major terrorist incidents, as follows:   15
() ( )
() ( ) ( )
55 5 5
,0 0, , , , , , , ,
00 0 1
,         + year effects month effects day effects
i t c t wmp j wmp t j smb j smb t j hml j hml t j j i t j
jj j j
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(14) 
4.2  Risk perception as a determinant of stock market reaction 
In order to investigate whether risk perception contains significant information for 
abnormal returns, we recover the residuals () ,, ˆ |1 it ct mgt ε =  from model (14) focusing on 
the days of major terrorist events. Then we project the residuals on terrorism risk 







it ct s it it
s
mgt trp u εγ γ
=
==+ + ∑                                    (15) 
After the estimation stage we proceed with three steps. Firstly, by the means of 
formal hypotheses testing, we establish the preferred specification. Secondly, we test 
whether terrorism risk perception contains significant explanatory power over abnormal 
returns. With respect to the second step we test the following hypotheses:  
0 :0 ,      s Hs γ = ∀                           (16)      
Provided that this set of hypotheses is rejected, it would imply that terrorism risk 
perception provides a channel of diffusion and furthermore, the diffusion of terrorist 
shocks is non-uniformly distributed across countries.     
5. Empirical  results 
5.1   Preliminary unconditional analysis  
As a prelude to the subsequent econometric analysis we provide a few graphs that 
will shed light in data properties. Graph 1 shows the cross-section of daily returns across 
29 European countries on each of these four terrorist events. The percentage of stock   16
indices that dropped on the day of these attacks ranges from 81 % (on the Moscow 
attack) to 88% (on the Madrid attack). In addition, the sample means of realized returns 
were -1.35 % on the Moscow attack, -0.71 % on the Istanbul attack, -1.51 % on the 
Madrid attack and finally -0.63 % on the London attack. This information however 
merely provides a general picture of market outcomes on the very same days of attack 
occurrences. It neither provides evidence for a significant negative impact of these events 
on stock markets, nor does it convey any information about the determinants of the cross-
sectional variation of reactions to these events. These will be assessed in the context of a 
formal econometric model later on.  
----------Graph 1---------- 
In Graph 2 we explore the relationship between observed returns on the days of 
these terrorist events and terrorism risk perception. The graph indicates that raw returns 
tend to be more negative as risk perception increases, and moreover non-linearities are 
present.      
   ----------Graph 2---------- 
5.2  Main Results  
Before we embark on the investigation of our main hypotheses, we first estimate the 
parameters of the three-factor world model under a set of alternative techniques and 
specifications, with the aim to select the one which more adequately fits daily returns. In 
particular, we use Random-Effects, and three Pooled Panel GARCH models; a PP-
ARCH(1), a PP-ARCH(2) and a PP-GARCH(1,1). Estimation results are given in Table 
A1 in the Appendix. The RE model is outperformed by its PP-GARCH counterparts since 
in every specification parameters in the conditional volatility equation are highly   17
significant, suggesting that volatility clustering is present. Then after a sequence of 
Likelihood Ratio tests, the PP-GARCH(1,1) emerges as the preferred specification. 
However, for comparison purposes we will also consider residuals from all 
specifications.    
The results in Table 4 correspond to the baseline three-factor world model with 
the terrorism events dummy. The coefficient of the terrorism dummy attains a negative 
sign and is highly significant, verifying that on days of major terrorist attack occurrences 
returns are indeed significantly lower. Thus, we document that the average reaction, i.e. 
across the countries’ stock indices has been significantly negative. This finding is in line 
with the previously reported evidence (see Carter and Simkins 2004; Chen and Siems 
2004; Drakos 2004; Eldor and Melnick 2004; Gulley and Sultan 2006; Amélie and Darné 
2006; Nikkinen et al., 2008).  
----------Table 4---------- 
In Table 5 we report the results from projecting abnormal returns to the proxy of 
countries’ terrorism risk perception. Although both the linear and quadratic models are 
statistically significant, the cubic model outperforms them, leading to a fivefold increase 
in explained variation. Terrorism risk perception is able to explain about 23 % of the 
cross-country abnormal returns’ variation. The estimated parameters’ signs suggest that 
abnormal returns, i.e. the size of the stock market reaction, initially increase (in absolute 
magnitude) with the level of risk perception, then tend to decrease for intermediate levels 
of risk perception, and finally start to increase again for high levels of risk perception.     
----------Table 5----------   18
5.3 Sensitivity  analysis 
5.3.1  Controlling for past terrorism record 
Terrorism risk perception is probably not an exogenous variable, in the sense that 
it is determined by several country characteristics. Among these characteristics, we 
expect a country’s record of terrorism activity to play a prominent role. In other words, 
we expect past terrorist record to shape, at least to some extent, risk perception. For this 
purpose we collected the number of terrorist incidents by country and year from 1980 
until 2004, as provided by the Global Terrorism Database developed at the University 
of Maryland, containing both domestic and international incidents (LaFree and Dugan 
2007). Then for each country we calculated the sample average of terrorist incidents 
() terr  at fours points in time: (i) from 1980 to 2001, (ii) from 1980 to 2002, (iii) from 
1980 to 2003, and (iv) from 1980 to 2004. Graph 3 depicts the relationship between 
terrorism risk perception (by country) and historical terrorist intensity up to the previous 
year. The graph shows a strong positive relationship between the two indicating that 
terrorism risk perception clearly increases with the level of past terrorism activity.   
----------Graph 3---------- 
Furthermore, raw returns on days of terrorist attacks are also related to countries’ 
past terrorist record as shown in Graph 4.   
----------Graph 4---------- 
  Thus, in order to test whether stock market reactions indeed reflect risk 
perception, and not merely a country’s terrorism track record, we adopt the following 
tactic. Firstly, we regress abnormal returns on past terrorism activity and recover the 
residuals. These residuals represent the component of abnormal return not explained by 
terrorism history. Secondly, we test if terrorism risk perception has any explanatory   19
power over these residuals. Table 6 summarizes the estimation results from these 
regressions. In Panel A we show the estimation results from the regressions of abnormal 
returns on past terrorist activity, which suggest that countries with a high record react 
more vigorously. Thus, given the strong correlation between risk perception and past 
terrorism record, stock market reactions do reflect a country’s terrorism history. 
However, the estimation results in Panel B indicate that terrorism risk perception contains 
significant explanatory power for the component of abnormal returns that is orthogonal to 
past terrorism activity. Thus, we conclude that risk perception affects stock market 
reactions, over and above a country’s terrorism history.   
  ----------Table 6---------- 
5.3.2  Controlling for economic linkages 
As mentioned in the Introduction the reaction of third countries can also be 
interpreted as a contagion phenomenon, broadly defined as the cross-national diffusion of 
shocks, that can be generated by two rather dissimilar processes (for excellent and 
extensive reviews see Wolf 1999; Dornbusch et al., 2000). The first process is 
interdependence, referring to the innate consequence that real and financial linkages act 
as facilitators of shock transmission, what has been called ‘fundamentals-based 
contagion’ (Calvo and Reinhart 1996; Masson 1998; Forbes and Rigobon 2002). Thus, a 
country’s reaction increases as its linkages with the rest of the world deepen. The second 
process resulting in contagion, abstains from the role of fundamentals, and places more 
emphasis on various ‘irrational’ phenomena triggered by investors’ behavior (Calvo and 
Mendoza 2001; Kodres and Pritsker 2001).     20
Let  () i  denote the country and ( ) y  the year. For each country we calculate the 
sum of its exports () , iy X  and imports ( ) , iy M , and measure what percentage it 





    ∑ . So we proxy a country’s real 
















 =  + 
 ∑
                                    (17)            
The calculations are based on the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
database,  which provides the value (in US Dollars) of trade (imports and exports) 
between a given country and its trading partners.             
In a similar manner we proxy the degree of a country’s financial linkages by the 
percentage the sum of its total outward () , iy OI  and inward () , iy II  investment represented 
in the global total investment portfolio  () , iy
world
OI II
















 =  + 
 ∑
                      (18)            
The calculations are based on the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment 
Survey (CPIS) database, which provides information on the stock of cross-border 
holdings of securities (equity securities and long- and short-term debt securities) valued 
at market prices prevailing at the end of each year, and broken down by the economy of 
residence of the issuer of the securities. Note that these securities are not part of the 
balance of payments data categories of direct investment, reserve assets, or financial 
derivatives.   21
Table 7 reports the basic descriptive statistics (for 2002-2005) for the real and 
financial linkages proxies by country. Starting with real linkages, Germany exhibits the 
highest degree, followed by France, the UK, and Italy with 8.46 %, 4.77%, 4.39 %, and 
3.63 % respectively. As it regards financial linkages, the UK is ranked first, followed by 
Germany, France, and Luxemburg, with 9.38 %, 7.72 %, 6.78 % and 5.78 % respectively. 
Also note the strong correlation between the real and financial linkages proxy, which is 
about 0.82 and is indicative of the commonality in information, precluding their joint 
inclusion as explanatory variables in any regression model.  
----------Table 7---------- 
In Table 8 we present the results from two hybrid models that include jointly 
linkages (either real or financial) and terrorism risk perception. These will assist us in two 
respects. Firstly, to assess whether terrorism risk perception has any incremental 
explanatory power when we condition on either form of linkages and secondly, to arrive 
at the model with the highest explanatory power for abnormal returns.  
According to our results, irrespectively to which type of linkages we condition 
upon, terrorism risk perception has significant incremental explanatory power for 
abnormal returns. In both specifications we emphatically reject the null hypothesis of 
zero perception effects (p-value 0.01). In fact, in the presence of risk perception financial 
linkages are insignificant determinants of abnormal returns. In contrast, real linkages are 
strong predictors of abnormal returns. These findings provide empirical support for the 
conjectured behavioral-based mechanism underlying stock market reaction to major 
terrorism events. The hybrid model that includes both real linkages and terrorism risk 
perception is able to account for about 31 percent of the cross-country abnormal returns   22
variation. We also consider the possibility that linkages and terrorism risk perception not 
only work in parallel, but also determine the transmission of shocks jointly. To test for 
this possibility we augment the hybrid models (linkages and risk perception) by a third 
order polynomial of their interaction. According to our results interaction effects are 
insignificant suggesting that shocks are diffused by the two mechanisms separately.           
  ----------Table 8---------- 
6. Conclusions 
The extant literature has provided conclusive evidence that stock markets reactions’ to 
major terrorist events are sizeable and also extending to third countries (i.e. other than the 
country witnessing the terrorist attack). The present study econometrically explores the 
underlying mechanism responsible for third countries’ reaction. The analysis considers 
the ability of terrorism risk perception to explain cross-country abnormal returns. Our 
results suggest that abnormal returns are indeed significantly related to terrorism risk 
perception, and furthermore this relation is non-linear. The estimated coefficients suggest 
a sinoidal pattern, where abnormal returns become more negative for risk perception 
increases over relatively low levels of the latter. Then the absolute magnitude of 
abnormal returns decreases for intermediate levels of risk perception, and then starts to 
increase again for high levels of risk perception.  Moreover, risk perception’s predictive 
power over abnormal returns is robust, even w h e n  w e  t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  c o u n t r i e s ’  
terrorism record or when we control for economic linkages.         
These findings imply that terrorist shocks are diffused through the channel 
provided by terrorism risk perception, which works as an amplifier. Thus, countries with 
higher (lower) terrorism risk perception are more likely to witness a higher (lower) stock   23
market reaction. Our results have important implications for practitioners since they shed 
light into the diffusion mechanism of terrorism shocks. Essentially it is driven by an 
observed and quantifiable country characteristic, which managers could consider when 
constructing their portfolios. Given that stock market reaction is not uniform, but depends 
on the country’s risk perception and linkages, it implies that there are still diversification 
benefits. From a purely academic point of view, these results add another dimension to 
the spectrum of behavioral effects on capital markets, related to a social phenomenon that 
has recently undergone an important structural shift. 
Future research could explore whether the risk perception channel attains its 
predictability not only in the occurrence of major terrorist events but also in overall 
terrorism activity. Moreover, a plausible extension is whether the dependence of market 
reactions is jointly, and possibly interactively, determined by risk perception and the 
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 Appendix 
Table A1. Baseline specification for daily stock returns: Three-Factor World Model (2002-2005) 
  Random Effects  PP-ARCH(1)
 a PP-ARCH(2)  PP-GARCH(1,1) 
Regressor  Point estimate (z-score)
 b 
  Mean equation 
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c included  included  included  included 
Month effects  included  included  included  included 
Day effects  included  included  included  Included 
Conditional Variance Equation 













GARCH(1) -  -  -  0.8623
*** 
(296.02) 









Log Likelihood  -  -35693.27  -34877.54  -33067.74 
LR Test










Notes: (a) PP-ARCH stands for Pooled Panel Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticty, (b) ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
respectively, (c) Year, Month, Day effects include 3, 11, 4 zero/one dummies identifying each year, month and day, (d) LR stands for Likelihood Ratio.   29
Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for daily index and factor returns (1/1/2002 – 30/12/2005)
a  
Panel A: country stock market indices  
Country mean
b  stdev max  min  skewness  kurtosis  #  of  obs 
Austria  0.117 0.854 2.963 -4.483  -0.539  5.395  992 
Belgium  0.023 1.237 9.333 -4.392  0.466  9.730  1026 
Bulgaria  0.197 1.464 8.387 -8.237  0.137  8.803  983 
Croatia  0.065 1.484  13.258  -13.38  -0.025  28.941  991 
Cyprus  0.164 1.161 4.215 -2.993  0.330  4.038  329 
Czech Republic   0.131 1.121 3.733 -5.999  -0.456  5.123  1000 
Denmark  0.037 1.111 4.969 -5.592  -0.219  6.109  1003 
Estonia  0.150 0.932 7.178 -3.937  0.665  10.149  1012 
Finland  -0.007 1.694 6.431 -9.231  -0.310  6.210  1004 
France  0.001 1.476 7.002 -6.044  0.064  6.587  1026 
Germany  0.051 0.898 4.173 -4.173  -0.426  5.619  1020 
Greece  0.034 1.030 4.100 -3.838  0.094  3.916  997 
Hungary  0.106 1.297 4.361 -6.655  -0.284  4.540  1006 
Ireland  0.025 0.988 4.775 -6.124  -0.803  8.178  1011 
Italy  0.021 0.921 4.241 -4.773  -0.416  5.622  1016 
Latvia  0.108 0.987 4.967 -6.974  -0.411  10.669  996 
Lithuania  0.177 1.060  11.865  -13.515  -0.225  49.309  1004 
Luxemburg  0.030 0.911 3.494 -5.256  -0.237  5.299  1004 
Malta  0.085 0.702 6.097 -3.660  0.979  11.636  951 
Netherlands  -0.014 1.653 9.516 -7.169  0.167  7.089  1025 
Poland  0.093 1.057 4.422 -3.399  0.109  4.047  1005 
Portugal  0.024 0.694 2.330 -3.173  -0.510  5.211  1016 
Romania  0.213 1.447 9.241  -10.280  0.053  9.443  984 
Slovakia  0.145 1.275 5.827 -5.354  0.110  6.163  882 
Slovenia  0.079 0.728 8.310 -4.767  1.487  24.511  972 
Spain  0.033 1.121 4.856 -4.338  0.052  5.480  1006 
Sweden  0.023 1.242 7.256 -5.346  0.135  6.391  1005 
Turkey  0.105 2.219  11.793  -13.340  0.003  7.987  1001 
UK  0.011 1.050 5.094 -5.147  -0.203  7.331  1011   30
Panel B: benchmark portfolios (risk factors)  
MSCI World Market 
Portfolio 
0.018 0.884 4.751 -3.924  0.139  6.544  1043 
MSCI World Small  0.047 0.738 3.556 -2.877  -0.192  4.362  1043 
MSCI World Large  0.010 0.878 4.766 -3.997  0.138  6.767  1043 
MSCI World Value  0.017 0.940 5.423 -4.177  0.151  6.960  1043 
MSCI World Growth  0.007 0.848 4.656 -3.867  0.123  6.136  1043 
SMB, (Small – Large)  0.036 0.389 1.798 -1.934  -0.177  6.034  1043 
HML, (Value – 
Growth) 
0.010 1.185 5.456 -5.917  0.181  5.978  1043 
Notes:  (a) Percentage change in daily index -based on own calculations- (original source: Datastream), (b) mean, stdev, max, min, skewness, kurtosis stand for the sample 
mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum, respectively. 
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 Table 2.  Terrorism Risk Perception by Country (2002-2005)
a 
Country
b  mean stdev  max min 
Austria  5.67 1.90  7.56  3.02 
Belgium  6.82 2.39  10.01  4.24 
Bulgaria  3.94 1.25  5.08  2.60 
Croatia  1.12 0.17  1.25  1.00 
Cyprus  4.25 1.52  6.00  3.20 
Czech Republic  2.59 0.82  3.53  2.00 
Denmark  16.58 5.84  22.52  9.79 
Estonia  1.72 0.31  2.00  1.38 
Finland  3.95 1.55  5.97  2.18 
France  10.01 1.74  11.42  7.47 
Germany  5.97 3.74  11.53  3.37 
Greece  4.07 2.43  1.90  7.09 
Hungary  3.10 2.02  5.42  1.67 
Ireland  4.55 1.49  6.60  3.13 
Italy  14.15 3.57  16.86  9.03 
Latvia  1.92 0.77  2.60  1.07 
Lithuania  1.78 0.72  2.59  1.18 
Luxemburg  7.18 2.12  10.16  5.17 
Malta  2.06 0.83  3.00  1.40 
Netherlands  14.69 11.43  31.35 5.46 
Poland  3.91 2.01  6.20  2.40 
Portugal  3.46 1.37  4.50  1.44 
Romania  3.54 0.91  4.19  2.50 
Slovakia  3.61 1.84  5.35  1.67 
Slovenia  2.23 0.91  3.20  1.39 
Spain  53.92 11.78  66.00  38.41 
Sweden  4.30 0.97  5.30  3.00 
Turkey  21.56 11.72  34.48  11.60 
UK  23.94 3.80  26.65  18.57 
All countries   8.79 11.59  66.00  1.00 
Notes: (a) Percentage of country respondents mentioning terrorism as one of the two most important issues their country faced - based on own calculations- (original source: 
Eurobarometer issues 57.2, 60.1, 62.0, 64.2), (b) Data for Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Turkey are available from 2003 onwards.          32
 
Table 3: Background information on major terrorist attacks used as stimulus 
City Date  Timing  Location  Deaths  Injuries 
Moscow  October 23
rd 2002  9:05 pm local time (5:00 pm GMT)  Theater  179  656 
Istanbul  November 20
th 2003 
11:10 am local time (9:10 am 
GMT) 
British consulate and offices of HSBC bank  60  400 
Madrid  March 11
th 2004 
7:37 am local time 
(6:37 am GMT) 
Train stations  191  1876 
London  July 7
th 2005  8:50 – 9:47 am local time  Underground trains, bus  54  700 
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Table 4. The impact of major terrorist events on returns 
  Random Effects  PP-ARCH(1)
 a PP-ARCH(2)  PP-GARCH(1,1) 
Regressor  Point estimate (z-score)
 b, c 
Mean equation 
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d Included  included  included  included 
Month effects  Included  included  included  included 
Day effects  Included  included  included  included 
Conditional Variance Equation 













GARCH(1) -  -  -  0.8628
*** 
(91.28) 









Log Likelihood  -  -35671.09  -34852.94  -33047.58 
LR Test









Notes: (a) PP-GARCH stands for Pooled Panel Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticty, (b) ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
respectively, (c) z-scores based on robust standard errors, (d) Year, Month, Day effects include 10, 11, 4 zero/one dummies identifying each year, month and day, (e) LR stands for 
Likelihood Ratio.  
Table 5.  Terrorism risk perception and abnormal returns on days of major terrorist events  
Abnormal returns 
from:  Random Effects  PP-ARCH(1)  PP-ARCH(2)  PP-GARCH(1,1) 
Point estimate (t-test)
 a, b 
Regressor Linear  Quadratic  Cubic  Linear  Quadratic  Cubic  Linear Quadratic  Cubic  Linear Quadratic  Cubic 
Panel C: Terrorism Risk Perception
c  



























































3 trp   - - 
-0.00013
*** 
(-3.86)  - - 
-0.00013
*** 
(-3.93)  - - 
-0.00013
*** 


















Notes: (a) ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively, (b) t-tests based on robust standard errors, (c) estimation is based on 91 observations.   
 
Table 6. Sensitivity analysis I: removing the effect of past terrorism record   
Panel A: Past terrorism record and abnormal returns 
Abnormal returns from:  Random Effects  PP-ARCH(1)  PP-ARCH(2)  PP-GARCH(1,1) 
Point estimate (t-test)
 a, b 
Regressor  Linear Quadratic Linear  Quadratic Linear Quadratic  Linear  Quadratic 

























2 terr   -  0.0003
*** 
(3.13)  -  0.0003
*** 
(3.05)  -  0.0003
*** 




3 terr   - - -  - - -  -  - 










Panel B: Terrorism risk perception and abnormal returns unexplained by past terrorism record   
Regressor  Random Effects  PP-ARCH(1)  PP-ARCH(2)  PP-GARCH(1,1) 














































Notes: (a) ***, ** denote significance at the 1 and 5 percent level respectively, (b) t-tests based on robust standard errors, (c) estimation is based on 91 observations.  Table 7.  Real and Financial linkages by country (2002-2005)
 
  Real linkages
a   Financial linkages
b 
Country mean  stdev  max  min  mean  stdev  max  min 
Austria  1.08  0.03  1.12  1.05   1.07   0.03  1.11   1.04  
Belgium  2.66 0.02  2.69  2.63  1.73  0.07  1.82  1.63 
Bulgaria  0.11 0.01  0.13  0.09  0.01 0.002 0.01 0.008 
Croatia  0.11 0.005  0.12  0.10 0.01  0.002  0.02  0.01 
Cyprus  0.07 0.006  0.08  0.06 0.03  0.008  0.04  0.02 
Czech Republic  0.63 0.03  0.66  0.58  0.05  0.01  0.06  0.04 
Denmark  0.72 0.01  0.74  0.70  0.67  0.05  0.73  0.60 
Estonia  0.08 0.004  0.09  0.07  0.009 0.002  0.01  0.006 
Finland  0.63 0.01  0.64  0.60  0.72  0.03  0.76  0.68 
France  4.77 0.18  4.94  4.51  6.78  0.35  7.09  6.32 
Germany  8.46 0.21  8.71  8.21  7.72  0.41  8.02  7.12 
Greece  0.35 0.01  0.37  0.33  0.47  0.09  0.55  0.34 
Hungary  0.57 0.01  0.58  0.54  0.08  0.01  0.10  0.07 
Ireland  1.07 0.05  1.14  1.01  3.24  0.29  3.55  2.89 
Italy  3.63 0.12  3.77  3.46  4.55  0.20  4.74  4.26 
Latvia  0.07 0.003  0.08  0.06  0.001 0.0004 0.002 0.001 
Lithuania  0.10 0.006  0.11  0.09  0.005 0.001 0.006 0.004 
Luxemburg  0.18 0.01  0.20  0.16  5.78  0.15  5.95  5.58 
Malta  0.04 0.006  0.05  0.04 0.02  0.018  0.05  0.01 
Netherlands  3.37 0.03  3.39  3.31  4.88  0.14  5.00  4.66 
Poland  0.75 0.04  0.81  0.67  0.10  0.03  0.14  0.06 
Portugal  0.53 0.02  0.56  0.49  0.52  0.02  0.54  0.50 
Romania  0.28 0.03  0.32  0.23  0.009 0.002 0.01 0.007 
Slovakia  0.27 0.02  0.29  0.23  0.01 0.003 0.02  0.01 
Slovenia  0.17 0.006  0.18  0.16  0.007 0.002 0.009 0.004 
Spain  2.28 0.08  2.35  2.16  2.43  0.22  2.65  2.15 
Sweden  1.17 0.03  1.20  1.14  1.21  0.03  1.25  1.16 
Turkey  0.75 0.10  0.85  0.62  0.08  0.02  0.11  0.06 
UK  4.39 0.25  4.67  4.07  9.38  0.22  9.69  9.17 
All countries   1.35 1.90  8.71  0.04  1.78  2.66  9.69 0.0014 
Notes: (a) Country share (percentage) in world total investment portfolio -based on own calculations- (original source: IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment 
Survey), (b) Country share (percentage) in international trade -based on own calculations- (original source: IMF International Financial Statistics).   
Table 8. Sensitivity Analysis II: the effect of terrorism risk perception controlling for linkages
a 
Regressor  Point estimate (t-test)
b, c 
() real   -1.61
*** 





2 real  
0.471
*** 





3 real  
-0.035
** 



































































3 * real trp   - -  0.0000005 
(1.08) 
- 
() * fina trp   - - - 0.019 
(0.42) 
()
2 * fina trp   - - - -0.0002 
(-0.55) 
()
3 * fina trp   - - - 0.00000007 
(0.72) 
2 R   0.315 0.256 0.320 0.268 










F-test: zero real linkages effects  4.69
***  - 4.44
***  - 
F-test: zero financial linkages effects  - 1.10 - 1.34 
F-test: zero interaction effects  - -  0.80  2.07 
Observations  91 91 91 91 
Notes: (a) Estimation based on the PP-GARCH(1,1) abnormal returns, (b) ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 














































aubebu cr cyczdkes fi fr gegrhu ir it la li lumanepopt ro sksnspswtu uk
London Attack
Raw Index Returns by Country and Event
 
Notes: au, be, bu, cr, cy, cz, dk, es, fi, fr, ge, gr, hu, ir, it, la, li, lu, ma, ne, po, pt, ro, sk, sn, sp, sw, tu, uk stand for 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and United Kingdom respectively.     
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Terrorism risk perception
Raw returns and risk perception (Lowess smoother)
 
Notes:  Based on pooled data across the four major terrorist incidents (Moscow, Istanbul, Madrid, London). Terrorism 
Risk Perception denotes the percentage of Eurobarometer respondents by country and year mentioning terrorism as one 
of the two most important issues their country faced at the time of the survey. Raw Index Returns denotes the daily 
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Average terrorist intensity (t-1)
Terrorism risk perception and past terrorist intensity (Lowess smoother)
 
Notes: Average terrorist intensity denotes the sample mean of terrorist incidents calculated at four points in time (1980-
2001, 1980-2002, 1980-2003, 1980-2004) for each country. Each mean is plotted against the country’s terrorism risk 
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Average terrorist intensity (t-1)
Raw returns and past terrorist intensity (Lowess smoother)
 
Notes: Average terrorist intensity denotes the sample mean of terrorist incidents calculated at four points in time (1980-
2001, 1980-2002, 1980-2003, 1980-2004) for each country. Each mean is plotted against the country’s raw return on 
the day of major terrorist attack in the following year (Moscow 2002, Istanbul 2003, Madrid 2004, London 2005).   